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The Slepak Principles Act and Soviet
Union-United States Joint Ventures:
Profits or People?
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Soviet Union's human rights record has improved
throughout the last year, further progress remains to be made.' To
encourage further Soviet reform and to ensure that United States
companies in the Soviet Union do not indirectly support human rights
abuses, the United States Congress recently introduced legislation
designed to promote United States-Soviet joint ventures and en-
courage Soviet compliance with human rights guidelines. 2 In general,
this legislation promotes the fair treatment of employees, safety in the
workplace, and environmentally safe production methods in the So-
viet Union. 3 However, the proposed legislation is voluntary. Failure
of a United States company to comply with the provisions of the pro-
posed bills would not be a violation of the law. The legislation merely
serves as a list of standards that Congress encourages United States
companies to follow. 4
The legislation consists of two bills introduced simultaneously in
the House and Senate on May 16, 1989. 5 The bills are collectively
referred to as the Slepak Principles Act ("Act"),6 after Vladimir
Slepak, an original member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group.7
Although the House bill is more forceful than the Senate bill, both
I. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1989); Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 16,
1990, at 20.
2. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
3. See H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
4. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1989); S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1989).
5. Bills Introduced to Encourage U.S. Firms to Follow Employment Principles in the
US.S.R., Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 98 (May 23, 1989). The bills carried bi-
partisan support. Pennsylvania Republican John Heinz and Arizona Democrat Dennis
DeConcini sponsored the bill in the Senate, and Washington Republican John R. Miller and
Florida Democrat Larry Smith introduced the bill in the House. Wash. Post, May 17, 1989,
§ I, at A18.
6. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1989); S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1
(1989).
7. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1989). The Helsinki Monitoring Group
formed to ensure Soviet compliance with the human rights obligations agreed upon under the
Helsinki Final Act. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 4 (Aug. 1989).
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enumerate principles which United States companies should follow
when entering into joint ventures in the Soviet Union.' Both the Sen-
ate and House versions are pending in their respective foreign rela-
tions committees.
The Act's introduction was precipitated by the Soviet Union's
failure to follow the human rights provisions it voluntarily agreed to
in the Helsinki Final Act.9 Although the Soviet Union has improved
its recognition of these fundamental rights, it is still violating the
agreement by using forced labor, discriminating in employee hiring,
terminating employees for exercising their rights, and confiscating
property from religious organizations. 10
During hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
many speakers opposed the Act on economic grounds." However,
Congress has previously authorized stricter economic sanctions
against other countries to induce changes in their human rights poli-
cies. Nonetheless, both bills are currently languishing in committee.
This Comment will first address the Soviet Union's human rights
situation and its continuing violation of the Helsinki Final Act. Next,
this Comment will examine the Soviet Union's acute need for indus-
trial modernization and joint ventures with the United States. This
need has created an opportunity for the United States to influence the
human rights policies of the Soviet Union. This Comment will then
compare the proposed Act with previous actions the United States has
taken with respect to human rights violations in other countries. Fi-
nally, this Comment will describe the Act in detail, analyze the argu-
ments for and against its passage, and assert that its enactment will
inhibit Soviet human rights abuses. This Comment will then con-
clude that Congress should immediately pass the Act and that the Act
will not economically disadvantage United States joint ventures in the
Soviet Union.
8. The House bill contains some measures of enforcement that the Senate bill does not
by providing that companies that fail to abide by the principles will lose a portion of their
export marketing support. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1989); Bills Introduced to
Encourage U.S. Firms to Follow Employment Principles in U.S.S.R., Daily Report for Execu-
tives (BNA) No. 98 (May 23, 1989).
9. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989); see H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1989).
10. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989).
11. See Administration Opposes Rights Bill For US. Firms Operating in the US.S.R.,
Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 178 (Sept. 15, 1989).
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II. SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
The Helsinki conference began on July 3, 1973, and concluded
two years later with the signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975.12
Thirty-five countries were present at the conference, including the So-
viet Union. 13 The common purpose shared by the attending nations
was to "contribute ... to peace, security, justice and co-operation as
well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States
of the world .... ,,14 The Final Act expressly recognized that human
rights are fundamental to the relationships between the signatories
and, therefore, must be scrutinized internationally.15
The Final Act gained much attention when signed because it rep-
resented the first occasion in which the Soviet Union entered into an
international human rights agreement.16 Unfortunately, subsequent
events indicate that the Soviet Union may have signed the Final Act
for the wrong reasons. Arguably, the Soviet Union's primary motive
for agreeing to sign the Final Act was to gain international acceptance
of the post-World War II borders in Eastern Europe, rather than to
further human rights. 17 The other signatories expected the Soviet
Union to abide by the terms of the Final Act.I8 However, these ex-
pectations remain unmet. 19
The Final Act provides that all participating states "will respect
12. KAVASS, GRANIER & DOMINICK, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN POLITICS, AND
THE HELSINKI ACCORDS 185 (1981) [hereinafter KAVASS].
13. Other countries present were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the United
States, and Yugoslavia. Id.
14. Id.
15. HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEE, SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS-CONFERENCE REPORT AND NINE CASE STUDIES 2 (1980) [hereinafter HELSINKI
WATCH COMMITTEE]. The Final Act is one of the most "comprehensive declaration[s] of
human rights ever acknowledged in an international forum" because the text incorporates both
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human
Rights. Id.
16. Chalidze, The Humanitarian Provisions of the Helsinki Accord: A Critique of their
Significance, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429 n.l (1980).
17. HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 3.
18. Chaldize, supra note 16, at 431.
19. In May 1988, two days before a summit meeting with President Gorbachev, President
Reagan made a speech in Helsinki, Finland, concerning human rights in the Soviet Union.
Although recognizing that some progress in this area had occurred, such as higher toleration
of dissenters, more emigration, and the release of dissidents from exile, Reagan declared that
Moscow "had not lived up to commitments on Human rights ... [that are a part of] the
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human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion. ' ' 20  The states must also "respect the
equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at
all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. . . ,21 The document is a statement of
political intent and thus has no self-enforcing mechanisms. 22 More-
over, the Final Act is not legally binding as a treaty, although many
signatories consider it to have the same effect.
23
Soviet participation in the Helsinki Final Act provided Soviet
human rights activists with a new way to focus their efforts. In 1976,
they formed the "Helsinki watch groups" in various parts of the So-
viet Union.24 These groups monitored the Soviet government's activi-
ties to determine if it was abiding by the terms of the Final Act. 25
Soviet citizens began to report human rights violations to these watch
groups, and the watch groups then publicized the violations interna-
tionally. 26 Over the next six years, the watch groups reported approx-
imately two-hundred human rights violations.27 Unfortunately, by
1982, these monitoring groups had dissolved because of the imprison-
ment of their members and the futility of their efforts.
28
III. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The Soviet Constitution grants Soviet citizens rights similar to
those articulated in the United States Constitution.29 For instance,
"citizens of the USSR shall be guaranteed freedom of: speech, press,
Helsinki Final Act." L.A. Times, May 22, 1988, Part I, at 14, col. 1. Reagan also called for
legal protection for those people wishing to practice their religions. Id.
20. KAVASS, supra note 12, at 191.
21. Id. at 190.
22. HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 3.
23. Comment, Soviet Human Rights Under Gorbachev: Old Wine in a New Bottle?, 16
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 177, 179 (1987).
24. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE U.S.S.R. 3 (1984) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. These reports included "stage managed trials, interference with mail and telephones,
mistreatment of political prisoners, persecution of religious believers, forced separation of fam-
ilies, denial of the right to emigrate, and harassment of workers attempting to form an in-
dependent trade union." Id.
28. Id.
29. Comment, supra note 23, at 178.
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assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations. ' 30 In re-
ality, however, political activity opposing the government is forbid-
den. 31 The Soviet government has viewed any attempt to change its
position on human rights issues as an effort to weaken the govern-
ment.32 Therefore, the government's policy has been to quiet the ex-
pression of nonconforming ideas. 33 In 1987, the Soviet Union finally
expanded its citizens' freedom by permitting "lawful" demonstrations
against the government. 34 Although demonstrators were not formally
prosecuted for their actions, many were interrogated, searched, fired
from their jobs, and put under administrative arrest. 35 Some protes-
ters were briefly placed in psychiatric hospitals. 36 At the end of 1989,
at least sixty people were still being held in psychiatric hospitals for
exercising their human rights.37 Soviet citizens have recently been ar-
rested and injured for demonstrating in support of their independence
or unofficial election candidates. 38 For instance, one priest was sent to
Chernobyl as punishment for participating in political demonstra-
tions.39 In Georgia, twenty people were killed and 3,000 injured when
Soviet troops attempted to disperse a group demonstrating for that
republic's independence.4°
Notwithstanding these recent human rights violations, the Soviet
Union has officially stated its plans for liberal human rights reform.
For instance, the Soviet government admitted that it had confiscated
30. KONST. SSSR art. 50 (1977), reprinted in W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM
3, 13 (1978).
31. Comment, supra note 23, at 178.
32. FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE, supra note 24, at 4.
33. Id. This is often accomplished by firing, physically assaulting, expelling from school,
or institutionalizing these critics. Id.
34. Citizens were also allowed to form "independent discussion groups" and print jour-
nals without having them confiscated by state censors. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
220 (1988). The Soviets have changed the law from one that prohibits anti-Soviet propaganda
to one that prohibits public incitement. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 244 (1990).
35. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 220 (1988).
36. Id. The Soviet Union historically punished its citizens for political crimes by confin-
ing them to psychiatric hospitals, even if they did not need medical attention. For instance, in
Moscow, 81,000 people were hospitalized in 1987, and 71,000 in 1988. 'Kommunist" Calls For
Reform of Psychiatric Service, THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP., SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Part I, § B (Aug. 20, 1990).
37. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 244 (1990). One man is still confined to a psy-
chiatric hospital because he held a sign that stated "meat for the workers and non-party un-
ions." Id.
38. Id. at 245.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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churches illegally. 41 However, the government's practices remain
substantially unchanged; the government continues to use the
churches for such things as warehouses and restaurants.42
Another example of the stark difference between Soviet policy
and Soviet action is the government's recent promotion of private en-
terprise. In 1988, as part ofperestroika, President Mikhail Gorbachev
allowed some Soviet companies to be self-governing and to retain
their profits.43 However, when these newly privatized companies be-
came too successful, the government would either shut them down or
tax them at such a high rate that it would be impracticable to con-
tinue operating as a private enterprise. 44
Another illustration of Soviet inconsistency is the government's
claim that it liberalized some of its laws, while it has made other laws
stricter. For example, before the October 1987 changes in the labor
law,45 a first time offender convicted of committing a petty crime was
relocated to a labor camp near his home to serve a short sentence,
with a six-day workweek. Under the new law, these first time offend-
ers may be sent to work in other republics many miles from their
families.46 In these labor camps, prisoners may be required to work
seven days a week.
47
Another human rights problem in the Soviet Union continues to
be religious persecution. It is still official Soviet policy "to hinder and
deny the free practice of religion and to deny freedom to emigrate to
the victims of religious persecution .... "48 Under this policy, the
Soviet government has sold many historic and national churches in
the Ukraine.49 Members of religious groups in the Ukraine have been
imprisoned or harassed for their beliefs. 50 The Soviet government has
limited Ukrainians' access to religious literature and subjected them
to many house searches, interrogations, and arbitrary arrests.51 So-
viet Jews, in particular, encounter considerable persecution. Many
41. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 5 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
42. Id.
43. Goodchild, How to Deal With the Soviets, Wall St. J., May 15, 1989, reprinted in
SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 5 (Aug. 1989).
44. Id.
45. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 220 (1988).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 450.
49. Act of May 2, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-305, 102 Stat. 452.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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feel that they live in grave danger.52 One million Jews are ready to
leave the Soviet Union, but thus far the government has issued only
300,000 exit visas. 53 Soviet officials blame the delay on an inadequate
number of airplane seats, stating that more will not be available until
1991.54
In a particularly egregious incident, four Soviet citizens sought
refuge from religious persecution in the United States embassy in
Moscow."5 However, before they could enter the embassy, Soviet
guards arrested three of the four and severely beat them. 56  Fortu-
nately, the fourth person was able to enter the embassy where Ameri-
can officials interviewed him.57
Despite the Soviet Union's poor human rights record, the gov-
ernment has expressed a willingness to discuss human rights issues.
Historically, the Soviet government has- avoided the topic of human
rights in discussions with the United States. 58 Recently, however,
Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, has been much
more willing to discuss human rights violations in the Soviet Union. 59
In fact, the Soviet Union has been willing to confront human rights
issues that United States officials have previously raised.6°
The Soviet Union has recently shown a genuine desire to reduce
its human rights violations. For example, the United States Depart-
ment of State announced that there were approximately 700 prisoners
convicted for subversive activities in Soviet prisons and camps.6' Sub-
sequently, 140 prisoners who were involved in anti-Soviet propaganda
have been pardoned and released by the government.62 Although
human rights abuses still exist in the Soviet Union, this heightened
response by the Soviet government to United States pressures to end
human rights abuse is one of the most surprising developments in
52. Weiss, Let My People Leave, NEWSDAY, Mar. 9, 1990, at 77.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 450.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Shipler, Dateline USSR: On the Human Rights Track, 76 FOREIGN POL'Y 164 (1989).
Many United States Secretaries of State have attempted to discuss human rights with Andrei
Gromyko, the Soviet Union's previous foreign minister. To one such allegation of Soviet
human rights violations, Gromyko responded, "Are you finished yet?" Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 164-65.
61. Comment, supra note 23, at 182 (citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 6).
62. Id.
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United States-Soviet relations.63 Some officials in Moscow even ad-
mit that "American opinion sometimes affects Soviet behavior." 64
On an international level, President Gorbachev publicly stated that he
wanted the United Nations to play a more aggressive role in human
rights enforcement. 65 Gorbachev also encouraged other governments
to enact laws encompassing international norms of human rights.66
However, despite the improvements that have occurred in the last
year, the Soviet Union is still a long way from complying with the
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.
67
IV. THE FAILING SOVIET ECONOMY AND THE NEED FOR JOINT
VENTURE INVESTMENTS
The Soviet Union's economy has steadily declined. 68 The gov-
ernment is attempting to revitalize the economy by encouraging joint
ventures with companies from other nations.69 "Soviets need Ameri-
can capital and ingenuity to achieve their political [and economic]
objectives."' 70 These objectives will require both restructuring the
economy and institutionalizing principles of democracy. Gorbachev
himself revealed this objective when he stated that in order for per-
estroika to succeed, "the serious, deep democratization of Soviet Soci-
ety [is required] which will enable us to involve [the people] in
reconstruction .... We need democracy like air. If we don't under-
stand this . . . our policies will founder, and reconstruction will
collapse."
'7 1
63. Shipler, supra note 58, at 165. The Soviet Union has responded positively to the
United States' reaction to the Soviet joint venture legislation, making changes acknowledging
United States objections. See Dean, Updating Soviet Joint Venture Law and Practice, 23
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 53 (1988).
64. Shipler, supra note 58, at 165.
65. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 218 (1988). Gorbachev's recommendation ap-
peared in an article printed in the Soviet newspaper Pravda. Id. The Soviet Union also wants
to host the human rights conference by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope in 1991. Carter, Why Moscow for a Human Rights Meeting?, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan.
12, 1989, at 15-A, reprinted in SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 7 (Mar. 1989).
66. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 218 (1988).
67. Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1990, at A10.
68. The economy suffers from "nearly every malfunction an economy can endure." L.A.
Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 4, at 6.
69. Id. at 1.
70. 135 CONG. REC. H1957 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Larry Smith).
71. Comment, supra note 23, at 181. Further, when the Soviet government recently ap-
proved the establishment of an Executive President and the end of the communist political
monopoly, Gorbachev stated "lilt is a giant step for the benefit of democracy and in the de-
fense of democracy." L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
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In January 1987, the Soviet government moved to strengthen its
inherently weak economy by passing a law allowing Soviet companies
to participate in international joint ventures. 72 This marked the first
time in over sixty years that the Soviet Union allowed foreign compa-
nies to invest in Soviet enterprises. 73 To Gorbachev, the concept of
joint ventures is a logical step toward his plan to restructure the entire
Soviet economy. By allowing joint ventures, the Soviet Union seeks
to achieve six basic objectives:
(1) gaining access to Western technology, particularly improve-
ments which will be jointly developed; (2) increasing exports of
Soviet manufactured goods by producing goods which are more
competitive on world markets; (3) training their work force in both
technical and managerial skills; (4) import substitution; (5) earning
foreign exchange; and (6) encouraging capital investment in the So-
viet Union and expanding trade with capitalist countries.
74
Ideally, the accomplishment of these objectives will raise the Soviet
economy to superpower status.
Since the joint venture law passed, Moscow officials have been
attempting to persuade United States businesspeople to establish joint
ventures with Soviet companies. 75 In 1987, United States-Soviet
trade was almost exclusively limited to United States grain exports.
76
The joint venture law was targeted toward attracting investors in en-
terprises that would produce food, energy, chemicals, health care
products, automotive products, and medical products. 77 In addition,
the new joint venture law provides United States companies with ad-
vantages they did not previously have. For example, while speaking
to United States businesspeople, Gorbachev stated that the Soviet
Union would not tax a joint-venture's profits for the first two years.
78
This benefit, combined with the Soviet Union's potential market of
280 million citizens, makes joint ventures especially attractive to
72. L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 1. Before this law passed, Gorbachev had
mentioned this option, but he did not seem serious about immediate implementation. Id.
73. Dean, supra note 63, at 53.
74. Id. at 54.
75. Gorbachev asked for "real action" at a convocation at the Soviet embassy with fifty
leading United States corporate and banking executives. L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 4, at 1,
col. 1.
76. Id. at 1, col. 3.
77. Firms originally expressing interest were Ford, Kodak, Nabisco, and Archer-Daniels.
L.A. Times, Apr. 14, 1988, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
78. L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 4, at 6, col. 3.
1990]
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United States companies. 79 Further, the Soviet Union allows these
ventures more freedom in such areas as production and input than
their domestic counterparts.8 0  Under the new law, joint ventures
have independent legal status.8' This gives joint ventures power to
obtain and possess property without fear of confiscation by the gov-
ernment. It also guarantees that Soviet law will protect industrial
property rights.8 2 Further, the law allows joint ventures to acquire
obligations and to sue or be sued in court.
8 3
Despite these progressive provisions, the Soviet government still
imposes conditions on international joint ventures. For example, a
United States partner in a United States-Soviet joint venture may
only own up to a forty-nine percent interest in the enterprise and may
not appoint the managing director.8 4 However, in response to the
concerns of foreign businesses8 1 and to further attract United States
companies, the Soviet Union enacted new rules allowing foreign ma-
jority ownership in joint ventures.8 6
The Soviets have also been willing to alter some of their most
basic rules to assist their foreign partners.8 7 For example, joint ven-
tures originally were required to abide by Soviet labor law concerning
salaries, work routines, recreation, and benefits.88 Now, however, the
Soviet Union allows the foreign partner veto power over the personnel
policies of the joint venture.
8 9
Perestroika has created new opportunities and challenges for
joint ventures in the Soviet Union. Foreign businesspeople agree that
the Soviets have been much more accommodating and "business-like"
in their approach to such ventures.9° Unfortunately, perestroika re-
forms have caused a high turnover of Soviet trade officials. Many
79. Id.; see Fin. Times., Sept. 13, 1990, § I, at 34.
80. Dean, supra note 63, at 55.
81. Id.
82. Id. Industrial property rights are industrial secrets such as patents. There is no So-
viet industrial property law; therefore, any protection must be included in the joint venture
agreement. K. HOBER, JOINT VENTURES IN THE SOVIET UNION IV.C(12)-(13) (1990).
83. K. HOBER, supra note 82, at V.B(I).
84. L.A. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
85. Dean, supra note 63, at 56.
86. Senate Schedules Hearings on the Slepak Principles, Press Release Newswire (July 20,
1989). The law has been changed so radically that a foreign partner can theoretically have
100% ownership. K. HOBER, supra note 82, at IV.C(6).
87. Fin. Times, Sept. 13, 1990, § I, at 34.
88. Dean, supra note 63, at 55.
89. Id. at 56.
90. Id. at 58.
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long-term contacts and relationships that United States business-
people had established have been affected. These businesspeople must
now establish relationships with new Soviet officials, which can be a
long and difficult process. 91 These new relationships must be based
and conditioned upon a mutual understanding of basic human rights
and dignity.
V. PAST UNITED STATES USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO
DISCOURAGE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. The Jackson- Vanik Amendment
In the past, the United States has placed major importance on
the progress of human rights development in the Soviet Union.
United States trade policy with the Soviet Union is closely tied to
overall United States-Soviet relations and is particularly influenced
by human rights and emigration issues.92  Therefore, the United
States has passed trade laws encouraging the observance of interna-
tional human rights.
One United States trade law that encourages international
human rights observance is the Trade Act of 1974.93 Specifically,
section 402 of the Trade Act, often called the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment,94 burdens potential United States profits to encourage other
countries to liberalize their emigration policies.95  By enacting this
law, the United States Congress effectively sacrificed profits for the
greater goal of putting an end to human rights abuses. The Slepak
Principles address human rights violations that are at least as cruel as
Soviet restrictions on emigration. The Slepak bill, however, is not a
91. Id.
92. Statement of Susanne S. Lotarski, Director, Office of Eastern Europe and Soviet Af-
fairs, United States Department of Commerce, before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on Europe (Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Lotarski]; see 135 CONG. REC. H1957
(daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. John Miller).
93. Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1980).
94. Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 152-53, 402, 407, 409, 88 Stat. 2004-06, 2056, 2063-64 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2192-93, 2432, 2437, 2439 (1982)).
95. Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432. Under the amendment, the President
can only extend nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to those countries which allow their citi-
zens the freedom to emigrate and do not tax, even nominally, those citizens wishing to emi-
grate. 19 U.S.C. § 2432. This prohibits a country from imposing taxes on "emigration or on
the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever."
Id. At first, the Soviet government cut back on emigration because of its resentment towards
the United States for legislating Soviet policy. However, in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union
began to increase the number of people it allowed to emigrate. Shipler, supra note 58, at 178.
1990]
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direct restraint on trade96 as is the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
Moreover, the Slepak bills are only voluntary.
Since the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Soviet emigration policies
have become more liberal.97 In 1989, more than 42,000 Soviet Jews
were allowed to leave the Soviet Union, the highest total since 1985.98
In light of the liberalization of the Soviet emigration laws, evidence
exists that President Bush may waive trade penalties under the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment.99 Contrary to what many think, there is evi-
dence that these types of bills are effective.
B. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
The United States Congress' response to South Africa's practice
of apartheid was much more forceful than the voluntary Slepak Prin-
ciples Act. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1976 ("Anti-
Apartheid Act") created mandatory sanctions which effectively pro-
hibited all future trade with South Africa. l° °
The Act was designed to encourage reform in the South African
government and establish a nonracist democracy.101 The Act requires
96. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 5 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
97. Brady & Javetski, How Bush May Help Open the Doors Wider for Soviet Jews, Bus.
WK, May 22, 1989, at 62.
98. Id.
99. Id. "President George Bush is expected to try wielding the amendment as an incen-
tive rather than as a punishment." By offering to waive the amendment, President Bush would
encourage the Soviets to further liberalize Soviet emigration law. Id.
100. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-116 (1988). The Act
prohibits, among other things, importation of military articles, id. § 5052; computer exports to
South Africa, id. § 5054; loans to the South African government, id. § 5056; air transportation
with South Africa, id. § 5056; landing rights of South Africa aircraft, id. § 5056a; nuclear
trade with South Africa, id. § 5057; importation of uranium, coal, and textiles from South
Africa, id. § 5059; new investment in South Africa, id. § 5060; United States government pro-
curement from South Africa, id. § 5064; promotion of United States tourism in South Africa,
id. § 5065; United States government assistance to, investment in, or subsidy for trade with
South Africa, id. § 5066; importation of South African agricultural products and food, id.
§ 5069; cooperation with armed forces of South Africa, id. § 5072; and, sugar imports from
South Africa, id. § 5073.
101. Id. § 5002; Butcher, The Unique Nature of Sanctions Against South Africa, and Re-
sulting Enforcement Issues, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 833 (1987). The Anti-Apartheid
Act essentially codifies an employment code for United States businesses in South Africa writ-
ten by the Reverend Leon Sullivan. As Reverend Sullivan was preparing to leave South Africa
after a visit fifteen years ago, airport security officials subjected him to a strip search and
ransacked his luggage. He was allowed to leave without further incident, but vowed to combat
South Africa's system of apartheid. Sullivan carried out his pledge by writing his "Sullivan
Principles." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, § A, at 8, col. 1. Though the provisions of the Slepak
and Sullivan principles are very similar, the Sullivan Principles apply only to United States
376
Slepak Principles Act
the South African government to accomplish six objectives before the
sanctions will be lifted.
The United States will work toward this goal by encouraging
the Government of South Africa to-
(1) repeal the present state of emergency and respect the prin-
ciple of equal justice under law for citizens of all races;
(2) release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu,
black trade union leaders, and all political prisoners;
(3) permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of
the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and
otherwise participate in the political process;
(4) establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws;
(5) negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South
Africa the future political system in South Africa; and
(6) end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neigh-
boring states. 102
Although United States public opinion was the motivating force be-
hind the Anti-Apartheid Act,10 3 it faced similar opposition to that
now facing the Slepak Principles Act.' °4 For example, Secretary of
State George Shultz argued that "South Africa's racial problems can-
not be changed by outside pressures."10 5 Instead, Shultz advocated
the administration's existing policy of constructive engagement which
"encourag[ed] peaceful change through quiet diplomacy."'06 How-
ever, Congress rejected the administration's approach and overrode
the President's veto of the sanctions.10
7
In light of recent events in South Africa, it appears that the sanc-
tions imposed by the Anti-Apartheid Act may have resulted in more
freedom for black South Africans. 10 8 For example, the South African
government recently released African National Congress leader Nel-
son Mandela, who had been in prison since 1962.109 Additionally, on
companies doing business in South Africa. 135 CONG. REC. S5514 (daily ed. May 17, 1989)
(statement of Sen. John Heinz).
102. 22 U.S.C. § 5011(b).
103. Butcher, supra note 101, at 836.
104. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, § A, at 8, col. 1.
105. Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1987, § A, at 21.
106. Id.
107. L.A. Times, June 23, 1987, § 2, at 5, col. 1. Even an advisory committee appointed
by President Reagan reported that the administration's "constructive engagement" policy had
failed. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
108. Schram, Apartheid's Fall Closer Than We Think, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 1990, at 59.
109. Id.; Roberts, Jones & Lawrence, The Beginning of the End of Apartheid, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Oct. 30, 1989, at 55. Due to the international sanctions and increased dissat-
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August 31, 1990, President Frederik DeKlerk announced that the
White National Party which has denied membership to blacks for
forty years is now allowing all races to become members."10 Further-
more, in his recent trip to the United States, DeKlerk stated that his
goal was to let "the majority live in an apartheid-free society.""'
Some experts believe that the Anti-Apartheid Act has economi-
cally isolated South Africa and is responsible for the South African
government's concessions." 2  However, despite these concessions,
most of the six objectives have not been met." 3 Therefore, the United
States government will not likely lift the mandatory sanctions against
South Africa until there is a complete dismantling of apartheid.
1 4 If
the United States were to lift the sanctions now, the South African
government would get the impression that the United States is satis-
fied with the present reforms, and that South Africa does not need to
make further improvements. 15
How can this United States policy of maintaining sanctions
against South Africa until there is a full dismantling of apartheid be
reconciled with the United States' failure to pass the Slepak Principles
Act, which would hold the Soviet Union to the commitments it made
in the Helsinki Final Acts? Despite recent improvements in the So-
viet Union, such as a relaxation of emigration laws, it is clearly incon-
sistent to defeat a bill that encourages the elimination of continuing
human rights violations.' 16 Increased profits simply cannot justify the
failure to vigilantly attack human rights abuses. Neither should the
United States Congress be apathetic in light of recent improvements.
isfaction at home, South Africa's President Frederik DeKlerk has made concessions such as
releasing political prisoners, allowing demonstrations, and beginning negotiations with black
leaders. Id.
110. L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 1. South Africa has 27 million blacks. Blacks
outnumber whites five to one and currently have no vote in national affairs. DeKlerk further
announced that before the 1994 elections he wanted a new constitution written that would give
blacks the vote while also protecting minorities, specifically whites. Id. at A19, col. 2-3.
111. Press Conference with Representative William Gray, Federal News Service, (Sept.
25, 1990) [hereinafter Gray Press Conference].
112. Schram, supra note 108, at 59.
113. For instance, although apartheid has been somewhat reformed, the entire South Afri-
can legal system incorporates apartheid. Gray Press Conference, supra note 111.
114. Id. President Bush's own United States trade representative stated, "Apartheid must
go before those sanctions are lifted." Bush, however, does not necessarily share this viewpoint.
Id.
115. Chicago Trib., Mar. 8, 1990, at 20. In Mandela's first speech after he was released, he
encouraged countries to continue to isolate South Africa. Id.
116. Failure to pass the Slepak Principles Act at this time will erode the respect for United
States trade policies that further human rights.
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As one commentator noted, "there may be a temptation to let the
[human] rights issue slide out from under the bright spot light that
has kept it so visible during the last decades. That would be a
mistake."' '7
VI. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. The Senate Bill
The Senate bill applies the Slepak Principles' 8 to United States
117. Shipler, supra note 58, at 166.
118. The Slepak Principles are named after Vladimir Slepak, a former Soviet citizen and
founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(12); see supra text accompanying notes 24-28. As a code of conduct for United States
businesses, the following principles place conditions on commercial activity and investment in
the Soviet Union in an effort to promote liberalization of human rights laws in that country.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
I. CIVILIAN PRODUCTION: Because Soviet military expansionism poses a
potentially grave danger to the United States and its allies, American companies en-
gaged in commercial transactions with the USSR should not contribute directly to
the strength of the Soviet military.
Therefore, each signator of the Statement of Principles will attempt to ensure, in
consultation with the government of the United States, that its commercial transac-
tions with the Soviet government do not produce goods nor provide services for the
military sector, or in any way jeopardize the national security of the United States.
II. LABOR FREEDOM: Because no moral sanction should be extended to
the practice of involuntary servitude, American companies engaged in commercial
transactions with the USSR should not employ goods or products manufactured by
forced labor.
Therefore, each signator of the Statement of Principles will suspend its use of
any raw material or product if reasonable suspicions arise that the product is manu-
factured by forced labor.
III. WORKERS' RIGHTS: Because dismissal from employment can be tanta-
mount to punishment, when the state is the sole employer, American companies en-
gaged in commercial transactions with the USSR should not permit Soviet employees
to be dismissed without good cause.
Therefore, each signator of the Statement of Principles will seek to ensure that
an individual's political or religious views, sex, ethnic or national background, or
involvement in activities protected under the Helsinki Accords and other statements
of human rights signed by the Soviet Union will not affect the status or terms of his
or her employment.
IV. ANTI-DESECRATION: Because fully independent congregations do not
control their own religious property within the USSR, American companies engaged
in commercial transactions with the USSR should not join in the secularization of
structures previously devoted to religious activities.
Therefore, each signator of the Statement of Principles will decline to participate
in a commercial transaction if it employs a structure previously serving as a religious
institution.
V. PRUDENT TECHNOLOGY: Because each person possesses a right to be
free from physical harm to his person and property, American companies engaged in
commercial transactions with the USSR should not employ dangerous methods of
production.
Therefore, each signator of the Statement of Principles will ensure that its meth-
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companies involved in joint ventures in the Soviet Union specializing
in sales, production, construction, plant modernization, or any joint
effort resulting in the formation of a business." 9 Currently, there are
more than fifty international joint ventures operating in the Soviet
Union. 20 Thirteen of these are United States-Soviet joint ventures
registered with the United States Department of Commerce. 12' At
the end of 1988, United States investment in United States-Soviet
joint ventures totalled twenty-three million dollars. 122 These invest-
ments are expected to swell in response to the Soviet Union's new
rules designed to lure investment of western capital.12 3
The Senators sponsoring the bill are seeking to condition this ex-
pansion in joint ventures on seven standards based on the Slepak Prin-
ciples.I24 First, the bill encourages United States companies not to
"use goods, facilities, or services when there is reason to believe that
these goods, facilities, or services were produced, wholly or in part,
with the utilization of forced labor."' 125 Many Americans believe that
ods of production do not involve technologies or processes that negligently pose a
physical danger to its workers, neighboring populations and their property. Nor
would it bring destruction or imbalance to the surrounding ecology.
VI. CAPITAL TRANSFER: Because transfusions of cash into the USSR are
necessary for the maintenance of the Soviet military, American financial institutions,
and their European affiliates should not participate in general purpose Soviet bond
offerings or in the extension of untied loans to the USSR. Credits extended to spe-
cific projects should be constantly monitored by the American government.
VII. FREE ENTERPRISE: We welcome the recent introduction of laws al-
lowing private Soviet citizens to engage in a limited form of private enterprise by
forming "cooperatives."
Therefore, we urge each signator to reach out to these newly formed coopera-
tives as a potential partner in joint ventures.
SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 8 (Mar. 1989).
119. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3, 5 (1989).
120. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Oct. 1989).
121. 135 CONG. REC. H1955, H1956 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. John
Miller). The largest joint venture to be successful, as of the end of 1988, was Occidental Petro-
leum. THE CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND CONFLICT STUDIES, GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION: THE REALITIES OF PERESTROIKA 16-17 (1989) [hereinafter CENTRE FOR SE-
CURITY AND CONFLICT STUDIES]. Other American companies that have established joint
ventures are Combustion Engineering, Inc., Management Partnerships International, Honey-
well Inc., and IDG Communications, Inc., which will publish the first computer technology
magazine in the Soviet Union. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A YELLOW LIGHT ON U.S.
JOINT VENTURES WITH THE SOVIETS 5 (1988).
122. Lotarski, supra note 92, at 4. The number of United States-Soviet joint ventures is
impressive. However, the total sum of foreign money invested is not significant. "What the
Soviets are primarily looking for from joint ventures is lessons from the west on how to export
to the west." THE CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND CONFLICT STUDIES, supra note 121, at 16-17.
123. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Aug. 1989).
124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1) (1989). Vladimir Slepak, the man for whom the
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forced labor in the Soviet Union disappeared with the perestroika re-
forms.126 However, the AFL-CIO estimates that four to five million
Soviets are still imprisoned for political crimes and subject to forced
labor in 2,520 labor camps. 1
27
Second, the Senate determined that a common Soviet employ-
ment practice is to discriminate in hiring and dismissing employees
who attempt to advance their own rights. 28 Thus, the Senate bill
urged United States joint ventures not to hire employees in the Soviet
Union on the basis of religion, political belief, sex, social background,
or advocacy of human rights.
129
Third, the Senate bill addresses the Soviet government's practice
of confiscating buildings used by religious groups. "Between 1917
and 1986 over 56,000 churches, seminaries, assembly halls, mosques,
and synagogues were forcibly confiscated by the Soviet state."' 30
Even during the era of glasnost and despite numerous requests, local
governments are reluctant to return church property to the people. 3
1
These traditional places of sanctuary and worship are being used as
joint venture bill is named, directed comments to United States companies wanting to engage
in joint ventures with the Soviet Union. He cautioned that "it is immoral to purchase goods
made with the 'slave labor' of Soviet work camps." U.P.I., May 2, 1988. United States com-
panies are already required to abide by the Smoot-Hawley Act which prohibits importation
into the United States of "all goods, wares, articles and merchandise mined, produced and
manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor and/or forced labor."
Smoot-Hawley Act, § 307, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988).
126. Hansen, The Slepak Principles: No Threat to American Traders, 11 WHITTIER L.
REV. 459, 462 (1989). "Tragically, there are as many Soviets toiling at forced labor today as
there were when Gorbachev came to power." Id.
127. Id. at 462-63. Soviet citizens are ten times more likely to be imprisoned than United
States citizens. L. ALEXEYEVA, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: FORCED LABOR IN
TODAY'S USSR at vi (1987). "Soviet prisoners suffer both mental and physical abuse and
mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement .... Life in prison or labor camps
continues to be marked by isolation, poor diet and malnutrition, compulsory hard labor, beat-
ings, frequent incarceration in punishment cells for violations of camp rules and inadequate
medical care." Hansen, supra note 126 (quoting Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1988, U.S. Dep't of State Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. and the House
Foreign Affairs Comm. (Feb. 1989), at 1214).
128. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at § 2(5) (1989). For example, the Soviet government
currently has an organization called the pervoi otdel, meaning "first section." It operates in the
workplace as a personnel department for businesses. The "first section" screens out citizens
who are "ideologically undesirable" or who have "participated in dissident activities without
breaking laws." The Slepak Principles Act: Hearings on S. 1018 Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of Tom Kahn, Director of the AFL-CIO)
[hereinafter Kahn].
129. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1989).
130. Press Release Newswire, July 20, 1989.
131. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 5 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
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industrial sites, warehouses, restaurants, and bath houses. I32 Recog-
nizing this egregious conduct, the Senate bill states that United States
companies should decline to participate "in an industrial cooperation
project involving the use of a structure currently or previously serving
as a religious institution or place of worship."'
133
Fourth, the bill addresses occupational safety in joint ventures,
stating that industrial operations should comply with international
standards for occupational safety.' 34  For example, chemicals or
methods of production that have been banned internationally should
not be used due to the harm they may inflict upon Soviet employees
and surrounding communities. 135
Fifth, the Senate bill links joint ventures to environmental con-
cerns in response to the Soviet Union's severe environmental
problems.1 3 6 For example, in Nizhni Tagil, a city in the Ural Moun-
tains, the air pollution from the local metallurgical plant was so dense
that motorists were forced to use their headlights at lunch time in
order to see. 137 The problem is not limited to one geographic area.
There are one hundred cities in the Soviet Union with air pollution
readings at ten times over acceptable standards. l3  Recently, in re-
sponse to the environmental problem, the government created the Na-
tional Environmental Protection Agency to oversee the country's
efforts to control environmental damage. 39 This agency is empow-
ered to promulgate standards and shut down violators. '4 The agency
can hold companies financially and criminally responsible for pollu-
tion or excessive consumption of natural resources. 14 1 To promote
further reform, the Senate bill encourages United States-Soviet joint
132. Id. For instance, the Kazan Cathedral in Leningrad now stands as a museum of
atheism, and the Church of Frol in the Tulla Monastery is now a public toilet. Id.
133. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (1989).
134. Id. § 3(4). For a comparable provision in the House bill, see H.R. 2366, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(5) (1989).
135. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Oct. 1989).
136. Ten years ago the Soviet Union denied having any type of environmental problem.
"Indeed, the belching chimneys and criss-crossed power lines that appeared in photographs on
front pages were emblems of Soviet achievement." L.A. Times, May 1, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
137. Id. "The air was so foul that children broke out in rashes on the way to school....
[Fifty-four] unexplained still-births [were] reported in the town last year, [suggesting] strongly
that bad air was to blame." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id."
141. UNEP News, Environmental Events Record, § 79, Supp. 7, Aug. 1988. For example,
on February 16, 1988, the new agency fined a metallurgy plant thirty-three million dollars for
polluting a reservoir in Northern Russia. Id. at Supp. 3. Robinson, Soviet Environmental
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ventures to adopt environmentally safe production methods in coordi-
nation with local leaders. 142
Sixth, the Senate bill encourages United States companies to en-
gage in joint ventures with "private [Soviet] cooperatives as potential
partners or participants in commercial activities, when... commer-
cially feasible and allowed by relevant law."'143 Typically, American
companies must engage in joint ventures with the Soviet government
because most Soviet businesses are government owned.44 By entering
into joint ventures with Soviet private enterprises, United States com-
panies may be able to prevent them from being taken over by the
government. This also promotes the United States' goal of world-
wide, free market capitalism.
Finally, the Senate bill establishes a reporting system which re-
quires the United States Secretary of State to periodically report to
Congress on United States companies' adherence to the principles set
forth in the bill.I 45 The State Department must also inform all United
States companies interested in joint ventures in the Soviet Union of
the Act's provisions. 146
B. The House Bill
The House bill, like the Senate version, applies the Slepak Princi-
ples to United States joint ventures in the Soviet Union. 147 Although
similar to the Senate bill, the House bill varies in several respects. For
instance, the Senate bill states that joint ventures should not use goods
Law: Emerging Business Constraints, in 506 COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE 199 (Public Law
Institute 1989).
142. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(5) (1989). For a comparable provision in the
House bill see H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1989).
143. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(6) (1989).
144. An indication of the Soviet government's reluctance to allow private enterprises is the
fact that such businesses are "either taxed to death, or shut down by the government when
they become too successful." Goodchild, supra note 43, at 5. This article's author, John
Goodchild, is an adviser to many business executives, some of whom are considering joint
ventures with the Soviet Union. The article endorses the Slepak Principles by stating that "if
we are going to... make a profit, we ought to lay the groundwork for something enduring."
Id. Private cooperatives generate only one percent of the Soviet Union's gross national prod-
uct. However, this figure is expected to increase by ten to fifteen percent over the next ten
years. Id.
145. S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1989). The entire bill is voluntary; therefore, if
companies fail to report, there are no official penalties to be levied. Id. These reports should
be made within two years after the Act is passed and then each year thereafter. Id.
146. Id. § 3(1).
147. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1989); see supra note 118.
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or services made with forced labor. 48 The House bill, on the other
hand, adds the additional requirement that these projects not only
refuse to use goods made with forced labor, but also, themselves re-
fuse to employ forced labor. 14
9
The House bill also includes a provision to ensure that United
States-Soviet joint venture projects do not support the Soviet military.
The bill's sponsors are wary of the United States assisting the Soviets
in wars with other countries. However, they are especially concerned
about American companies aiding the Soviet Union in producing
materials for future hostile action against the United States. Substan-
tial evidence suggests that the Soviet's expanding military capacity
relies heavily upon Western technological advances. 150 Accordingly,
the joint ventures must not "produce any goods or services of a criti-
cal or strategic nature for the Soviet military or in any way jeopardize
the national security of the United States."'' The drafters of the
House bill considered this provision to be so important that they
placed it at the very beginning of the bill.
The House bill also recommends that United States companies
not extend "untied" loans to the Soviet Union. 152 Untied loans are
148. It is the sense of the Congress that United States nationals involved in industrial
cooperation projects, especially joint ventures, in the Soviet Union and the Baltic
States, or seeking to do so, should undertake-
(1) to ensure that they do not use goods, facilities, or services when there is
reason to believe that these goods, facilities, or services were produced, wholly or in
part, with the utilization of forced labor .
S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1) (1989).
149. PRINCIPLES.-It is the sense of Congress that United States nationals engaged in
commercial activities in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States should adhere to the
Slepak Principles as follows:
(2) No USE OF MATERIALS MADE BY FORCED LABOR.-Suspend the use of all
goods, wares, articles, and merchandise that is mined, produced or manufactured, in
whole or in part, by convict labor or forced labor if there is reason to believe that the
material or product is produced or manufactured by forced labor and refuse to use
forced labor in the industrial cooperation projects being conducted by the United
States national.
H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(2) (1989).
150. Hansen, supra note 126, at 462 (citing CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET
ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE 6 (1985)).
The Soviets continue to acquire Western technology despite United States efforts to keep it
confidential. Id. at 461.
151. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(1) (1989). A United States truck manufac-
turing facility once acted against the United States interest when it unwittingly supplied troop
carriers for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pomice, Rules of the Road to Red Square, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REP., Nov. 27, 1989, at 63. The bill would hopefully prevent future
transactions such as this.
152. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(6) (1989).
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those not earmarked for any specific project. 53 These loans are sus-
pect because of the fear that they may be used for such unintended
purposes as indirectly financing the Soviet military. 5 4 On the other
hand, tied lending, under the bill, must be monitored by the United
States government. 55
Finally, the House bill is distinguishable from the Senate bill be-
cause it proposes a limited measure of enforcement. A joint venture
project would only receive United States export marketing support if
it adheres to the Slepak Principles Act. 156 Marketing support in-
volves a United States government representative meeting with a for-
eign national to promote the sale of a good or service in the foreign
market. 15 7 United States companies that continue to operate busi-
nesses in the Soviet Union without complying with the principles
would still receive government representation in trade disputes, but
would not receive marketing support. 58
C Support for the Legislation
Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania introduced the bill in the
Senate, arguing that United States companies should not be able to
open businesses in the Soviet Union and disregard human rights laws
which they must follow at home.- 59 The United States, as a leader in
addressing human rights issues, should help the Soviet Union pro-
gress in this as well.' 6° Further, the Senator stressed that the volun-
tary bill was merely an exercise in "consciousness raising" and not a
restraint on trade.' 6' Finally, Senator Heinz stated that "we should
not give the Soviets everything they want without getting something
in return. That's what these principles are all about."' 62
Representative John Miller of Washington introduced the House
bill, stating that the bill would contribute to the existing atmosphere
153. Wash. Post, May 17, 1989, at A18.
154. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, I THE SLEPAK REPORT 8 (Mar. 1989).
155. Id.
156. H.R. 2366, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1989).
157. Id. § 6(b).
158. 135 CONG. REC. H1955, H1956 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. John
Miller).
159. 135 CONG. REC. S5514 (daily ed. May 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. John Heinz).
160. Id.
161. Id. Senator Dennis DeConcini also made the same clarification in his speech before
the Senate, but he placed greater emphasis on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act than
Senator Heinz. 135 CONG. REC. S5515-16 (daily ed. May 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dennis
DeConcini).
162. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Mar. 1989).
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of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union. 163 He further stated
that these principles have a larger economic objective because they
"contribut[e] to a more democratic, more open Soviet Union, [and]
will ... ensur[e] a larger more stable market in which to operate."' 6
4
Representative Curt Weldon also supported these arguments stating
that
the United States must ensure that the Soviet Union is not making
cosmetic changes to reap economic benefits. By requiring our
companies to follow certain criteria when doing business with the
Soviet Union, the United States can encourage Moscow to con-
tinue its efforts toward establishing a more open society. 6
5
In addressing specific provisions, Representative Miller com-
mented that joint ventures which implement safe workplaces will
prosper. Providing a safe workplace will make United States compa-
nies more attractive to potential employees, thereby allowing United
States joint ventures to select higher quality workers than their Soviet
competitors.1 66 The safer working environment will also lead to less
turnover, and consequently less money spent on training new
employees. 167
In addition to the Congressmen that introduced the bills, many
United States interest groups have expressed their support. 168 For ex-
ample, the AFL-CIO stated that the time is right to introduce the
Slepak Principles so that a foundation of rules respecting human
rights can be established before the number of joint ventures in-
creases. 69 The Baltic America Freedom League also commended
Senator Heinz for introducing the bill and for referring to the Baltic
states separately from the Soviet Union. This group, however, was
163. 135 CONG. REC. H1955, H1956 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. John
Miller).
164. Id.
165. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 4 (Aug. 1989).
166. 135 CONG. REC. H1955, H1956 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. John
Miller).
167. Id.
168. 135 CONG. REC. S8337 (daily ed. July 20, 1989) (statement of Sen John Heinz). Or-
ganizations supporting the bills include the AFL-CIO, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews,
the Ukrainian National Association, the Armenian Assembly of America, the Baltic America
Freedom League, the National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, the Reverend Leon
Sullivan, the Latvian Environmental Protection Club, the World Federation of Free Latvians,
the American Latvian Association, the United Latvian Associations of Chicago, the Institute
on Religion and Public Life, and the Ukrainian American Community Network. Id.
169. Kahn, supra note 128, at 2; SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Mar.
1989).
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interested in adding provisions that would specifically address joint
ventures in the individual Baltic states. 170
The World Federation of Free Latvians also expressed their sup-
port for the bill, but stressed their struggle to become economically
independent. The Federation felt the bill could either hinder or help
their cause. 171 If "[Western involvement is] undertaken without re-
gard for the interest of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian people,
it could worsen the economic, political and social problems that the
Soviet occupation has brought to the Baltic people."' 172 Joining this
concern, the American Latvian Association stated that the Soviet
government has combined human rights violations and "industrial
and political exploitation to devastate these three formerly independ-
ent nations."'1 73 The Latvians fear that United States companies will
exploit the Baltic republics. These groups want to ensure that the
United States is aware of, and will respect their positions.
D. Opposition to the Legislation
During hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on September 14, 1989, critics testified that adoption of the legislation
would put United States companies at a competitive disadvantage. 174
They argued that the United States would have less influence than
other countries operating businesses in the Soviet Union that are not
bound by these restrictive principles.175
The president of the North American Grain Export Association
commented that the bill could affect United States grain sales to the
Soviet Union and, in turn, hurt American farmers and rural commu-
170. The three provisions they wanted to add were: (1) that no joint venture in the Baltic
States would allow the inflow of non-Baltic workers to fulfill any labor shortage; (2) all joint
ventures in the Baltic States will use the language of their respective republics in their everyday
business; and (3) "ethnic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians will be represented in all super-
visory and management positions in proportion to the demographics of the total force of the
particular republics." 135 CONG. REC. S8338 (daily ed. July 20, 1989) (letter from the Baltic
American League).
171. 135 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. July 20, 1989) (letter from the World Federation of
Free Latvians).
172. Id.
173. Although there is the concern of further exploitation by United States companies,
there is still much support for this bill. This group especially noted principles 5 and 6 of
section 3 which deal with environmental protection and private cooperatives. Id. (letter from
the American Latvian Association).
174. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT I (Nov./Dec. 1989).
175. Id.
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nities.176 Groups such as the American Association of Exporters and
Importers and the American Soybean Association submitted letters
opposing the bill. The letters reflected their concern that, despite the
bill's voluntary nature, it could easily become binding in the future.
The associations claimed that if this occurred, the bill would severely
impede United States business interests in the Soviet Union. 177 These
groups further expressed concern that by restraining trade, the bill
would weaken the incentive for the Soviets to comply with the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment.
178
There was also criticism of section 4(a) of the Senate bill, which
requires the Secretary of State to prepare annual reports on United
States companies' adherence to the Slepak Principles. Critics argued
that the requirement would burden heavily the United States embassy
personnel because collecting the necessary information would be too
time consuming. 1
79
Other critics of the bill argued that the Soviet Union would not
willingly adopt these principles if they are forced upon them by the
United States government. 180 Instead, the Soviets may be more recep-
tive to protecting human rights if these principles are voluntarily im-
plemented by United States companies operating in the Soviet Union.
A representative from the United States Department of Commerce
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there is
no need for the principles because United States companies "are
aware of the importance of human rights and emigration in
U.S.-Soviet trade relations . . . [and] that they will [not only] make
profits and improve the American trade balance, but also that their
cooperation will benefit Soviet workers and citizens."' 8 '
VII. ANALYSIS
Both Slepak Principles bills remain in committee. The argu-
ments against the bills are mostly profit-oriented. The critics of the
bills do not seem concerned about correcting the harsh injustices the
176. Id.
177. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, I THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
178. Lotarski, supra note 92, at 2.
179. Federal Information Systems, Sept. 14, 1989.
180. Lotarski, supra note 92, at 3. The weakness in this argument is that the Slepak Prin-
ciples are only voluntary and United States companies' compliance will be based on their own
volition.
181. Lotarski, supra note 92, at 6.
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Soviet government continues to impose upon its people and the poten-
tial for United States complicity in those injustices.
Some opponents argue that requiring United States companies to
abide by the bills' provisions would put United States companies at a
disadvantage because other foreign companies that operate in the So-
viet Union do not have the same restrictions. 8 2 This argument places
greater value on the short-term economic profits of businesses in the
Soviet Union than on the basic human rights and dignity of their em-
ployees. Moreover, these bills will only require United States compa-
nies to abide by the same laws that they are subject to at home.
United States companies should not be able to locate in another coun-
try to avoid United States laws. If establishing United States busi-
nesses in the Soviet Union is viewed broadly rather than just as a
short-term profit opportunity, the critics' alleged disadvantage may
develop into a long-term advantage.
18 3
The Slepak Principles bills are designed to "win the respect and
admiration of the Soviet people."'' 84 The United States operates
under the basic tenet that all people should be treated equally. There-
fore, when dealing with Soviets, whether as employees or as consum-
ers, the United States should live up to this principle and not subject
the Soviet people to the same type of treatment that the United States
has historically condemned the Soviet government for. Although the
Soviet Union in the past has not abided by its own anti-discrimination
laws, in this era of glasnost, discrimination by employers may attract
unwanted publicity and potential legal problems in the Soviet
Union. 185 Therefore, even if United States businesses are solely moti-
vated by profits, they should still be concerned about their discrimina-
tory treatment of Soviet consumers and employees. "If we're after an
enduring business relationship with the Soviet Union, our best bet is
to place ourselves on the side of the people."'18 6 If United States com-
panies fail to abide by the basic principles proposed in the Act, they
182. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
183. Potential benefits to United States businesses may include: greater productivity due to
higher employee morale; a better image in the eyes of the Soviet citizens; and a more stable
marketplace.
184. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Nov./Dec. 1989) (statements of
Dr. Alexander Slepak before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 14, 1989). Dr.
Alexander Slepak is Vladimir Slepak's son and the current president of the Slepak Foundation.
SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 8 (Oct. 1989).
185. K. HOBER, supra note 82, at VII.E(i).
186. Goodchild, supra note 43; Hansen, supra note 126, at 460.
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may alienate the Soviet people and face boycotts and strikes. 8 7 Such
a public reaction would certainly defeat the United States companies'
"6competitive edge."
United States companies that fail to help protect the Soviet envi-
ronment may eventually be disadvantaged.18 8 For instance, now that
the Soviet Union has shown more respect for its environment, the
United States should honor this effort and not contribute to the coun-
try's environmental problems. Strong Soviet public opinion exists
against any new pollution in the Soviet Union.18 9 By participating in
an environmentally deleterious joint venture, a United States com-
pany might alienate the Soviet people. It would be unfortunate if one
of the companies fined or shut down for violating pollution standards
was a United States joint venture company. Furthermore, an environ-
mental disaster would attract attention and possibly alienate Ameri-
can stockholders as well as Soviet consumers. 190
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Curtis W. Kamman, argued
at the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that
this is not the right time to introduce, "highly symbolic legislation
that would single out U.S. firms."'' However, the Soviet Union is
currently experiencing a time of great change. These bills would help
contribute to the reforms of perestroika and glasnost by encouraging
greater compliance with international human rights laws. 192 This, in
turn, will provide a better business climate in the future.
193
Dr. Alexander Slepak responded to Curtis Kamman's comment,
stating, "[s]ince when do we have seasons on human rights? Would
the State Department feel comfortable telling four million imprisoned
slaves in the Soviet labor camps-this is not the season to speak on
your behalf '?"' 194 Simply because the Soviet Union has improved its
human rights record does not mean that violations do not still exist on
187. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
188. Id. at 1.
189. Robinson, supra note 141, at 195. Protests over pollution in some cities included a
demonstration of 10,000 people against the pollution emanating from a coke-burning furnace
in Nizhny Tagil. This plant was later closed in April 1988. UNEP News, Environmental
Events Record, § 79, Supp. 1, Dec. 1988.
190. Pomice, supra note 151, at 63. Currently, there is a United States company located in
Latvia which is causing an environmental and ecological disaster in that city. SLEPAK FOUN-
DATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 4 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
191. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Nov./Dec. 1989).
192. 135 CONG. REC. H1956 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Larry Smith).
193. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, I THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Aug. 1989).
194. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 1 (Oct. 1989).
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a large scale. Passing the Slepak bills would send a message that the
United States respects the human rights of the Soviet people even in a
business context. "When it comes to human rights and human dig-
nity, the world looks to the Statue of Liberty to lead, and not to
follow."1 95
United States human rights policies must be consistent around
the world in order to maintain respect in the international commu-
nity. The severe and mandatory provisions of the Anti-Apartheid Act
simply cannot be reconciled with the United States Congress' failure
to pass the voluntary Slepak Principles Act. The same type of egre-
gious human rights abuses condemned by the Anti-Apartheid Act are
still occurring in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the mandatory re-
strictions placed on United States-Soviet trade by the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment have been successful in promoting reforms in Soviet emi-
gration practices. The Slepak Principles Act should be at least as suc-
cessful as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment using mere voluntary
restrictions.
Now is the appropriate time to pass legislation laying these prin-
ciples down as a foundation for United States-Soviet joint ventures.
196
The United States companies should be aware of these guidelines
before they establish themselves in the Soviet Union. If these bills are
passed after many United States companies enter into these joint ven-
tures, it may be more difficult to persuade these companies to alter
their established policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because the Soviet Union's economy so desperately needs United
States investment, and because the Soviet government has expressed
an intent to improve its human rights record, the Soviet Union may
be more amenable to accepting the Slepak Principles than some of the
Act's critics contend. 197 Some Soviet officials even admit that the
United States is having an influence on their reforms. One Foreign
Ministry official stated "[w]e are citing the American experience in
our reforms .... We want our society to be at the level of interna-
195. Id.
196. SLEPAK FOUNDATION, 1 THE SLEPAK REPORT 3 (Mar. 1989); see Hansen, supra
note 126, at 460.
197. Lotarski, supra note 92, at 3. Ms. Lotarski stated that the impact of the Slepak Prin-
ciples would be diminished if the Soviets felt that they were being imposed on United States
companies. Id.
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tional standards. We want our society to be civilized."' 198 Further-
more, labor activists, environmentalists, and human rights activists in
the Soviet Union have endorsed the Slepak Principles. Therefore, it is
prudent to immediately implement these principles while the Soviet
Union is responsive to United States concern and while the principles
would be most effective. The Slepak Principles will encourage liber-
alism and openness in the Soviet Union and the Baltic states. 199 These
principles are also a means of educating the Soviets about how United
States businesses operate in a democratic and capitalistic system.
The Soviet government must be reminded that although the So-
viet Union has made some human rights progress, much more must
be accomplished before the Soviet Union reaches acceptable interna-
tional human rights standards. Until the Soviet Union makes more
substantial advances toward reaching these standards, the United
States should not abandon or reduce pressure on the Soviet govern-
ment. This will reconcile United States-Soviet joint venture policy
with existing United States policies toward apartheid and Soviet
emigration.
The Slepak legislation will send a message to the Soviet Union
that human rights are still an important part of United States foreign
policy. The bills' passage will also familiarize United States compa-
nies with the human rights abuses that still exist in the Soviet Union.
Hopefully, this will encourage United States companies not to con-
tribute to or exploit these abuses. In light of the passage of more
stringent, mandatory laws in furtherance of human rights, the United
States Congress should immediately pass both the Senate and House
versions of the Slepak Principles Act.
Carolyn M. Sneider
198. Shipler, supra note 58, at 173.
199. Hansen, supra note 126, at 460.
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